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Given that entire industries face sustainability challenges, it is important to
understand the dynamics that lead “firms-in-an-industry” to engage in sustainable
product innovation. To provide more insight into the question of how innovation
activities spread from individual firm action to an industry-wide engagement, this
paper examines the automobile industry and the development of electric vehicles
(EVs). The analysis covers automobile incumbents over a crucial decade for EV
development in the industry, focusing on the different strategic motives that
especially the so-called “first movers” used to justify their earlier engagement. We
find that EVs became a core pillar of the incumbents' technology strategies through a
combination of coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures. Yet, the strategic motives
to engage in EVs stayed poles apart between different companies. The insights from
our study are relevant for those interested in the diffusion of sustainable product
innovation and in incumbent behaviour in sustainability transitions.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Why do companies in an industry collectively invest in sustainable
technologies? Previous research has shown that firms engage in sus-
tainable technologies as a response to environmental regulation, for
instrumental reasons, or as a reflection of managers' green values
(Dangelico & Pujari, 2010; Rennings, 2000; Sarasini & Jacob, 2014).
Various studies also argue that sustainable innovation can lead to a
competitive advantage (Blanco, Guillamón-Saorín, & Guiral, 2013;
Chen, Lai, & Wen, 2006; Cramer, 2000). However, the majority of
these studies tend to focus on product innovation that is autonomous
(e.g., biodegradable plastics or green roofs), but rarely on systemic
forms of innovation (e.g., the smart grid or new mobility services) that
are dependent on technological as well as societal changes (cf. Pinkse,
Bohnsack, & Kolk, 2014). Autonomous innovation and systemic inno-
vation, however, are fundamentally different. Whereas autonomous
innovation lies at the discretion of a focal company, the success of
systemic innovation requires the industry as a whole to engage in a
transition, otherwise chances for success of the individual company
are limited (e.g., Planko, Chappin, Cramer, & Hekkert, 2019). Dominant
theoretical explanations for firm behaviour regarding disruptive,
autonomous innovation might therefore not hold for systemic innova-
tion (e.g., Geels, 2018). A better understanding of how companies start
to engage in systemic innovation is important, given that many of
today's large technical systems (e.g., energy, transportation, railway)
are unsustainable, but answers to why and how companies start to
engage in this specific form of innovation are not straightforward.
On the one hand, so-called “firms-in-an-industry” (Geels, 2014,
p. 262) have few incentives to act “first” on systemic innovation, and
many more incentives to follow the general evolution of the industry.
Because the investments of competitors and the decisions of local and
global policymakers matter (Bohnsack, Kolk, & Pinkse, 2015; Pinkse et
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al., 2014), companies can be expected to be cautious to not move too
quickly and avoid costly investment failures (Rugman & Verbeke,
1998). On the other hand, competitive dynamics within firms-in-an-
industry lead to incentives to deviate from the overall industry behav-
iour (Kang & Song, 2017). Studies on the frequency and intensity of
adoption of sustainable innovation activities have shown that industry
frontrunners often took the initiative and were then followed by
others (Hockerts & Wüstenhagen, 2010; Kolk, 2010). For example, for
cases such as hybrid technologies in the automotive industry or
renewables in the electricity sector, copycat behaviour for more sus-
tainable technologies only occurred after the first incumbents
switched position. Here, the general evolution in an industry did not
necessarily result from concerted, collective action or industry coordi-
nation. Such tendencies to “jump on the bandwagon” (Abrahamson &
Rosenkopf, 1993) or “follow the leader” (Knickerbocker, 1973) have,
however, only received limited attention in relation to systemic inno-
vation. For a better understanding of the diffusion of systemic innova-
tion, insights into how innovation activities develop from individual
action to industry-wide engagement, and how first movers justify their
strategic motives to engage in this type of innovation, will be valuable.
This paper aims to contribute to answering these questions by pre-
senting evidence from the case of the automobile industry and the
development of electric vehicles (EVs) in the period from 2006 to
2016.1 Based on the analysis of the contents of four newspapers and
magazines as well as the annual and sustainability reports of the larg-
est international automobile companies, it examines how momentum
for EVs in the industry changed. It pays particular attention to
explaining how the strategic motives of several large companies that
“moved first” helped tilt the balance for those that were more hesitant
in embracing EVs.
Sustainable mobility has long been a key issue in the automotive
industry, following earlier concerns about climate change, increasing
regulation, and the ongoing need to meet environmental demands,
also from consumers who attach much importance to fuel efficiency
and environmental friendliness (Kolk & Levy, 2004; KPMG, 2014;
McKinsey & Company, 2013). As Zadek (2004, p. 126) put it when
describing “the path to corporate responsibility,” “automobile compa-
nies know that their future depends on their ability to develop envi-
ronmentally safer forms of mobility.” However, although the industry
developed lower emission vehicles in response, a major mobility tran-
sition has not taken place yet (Bakker, Van Lente, & Engels, 2012;
Bohnsack et al., 2015; Oltra & Saint Jean, 2009; Pinkse et al., 2014;
Van Bree, Verbong, & Kramer, 2010). This most notably applies to
EVs, which for a long time lacked economically viable business models
(Bohnsack & Pinkse, 2017; Budde Christensen, Wells, & Cipcigan,
2012; Kley, Lerch, & Dallinger, 2011) despite several experiments
(Bohnsack et al., 2014). Still, within the last decade, the industry chan-
ged from an outright sceptical view, following an earlier failed attempt
by General Motors (GM) with the EV1, which was eventually scrapped
in 2003, to a much broader adoption of purpose-built or adapted EVs.
The automotive incumbents' changed position is well illustrated by
two quotes from then-CEO of Renault-Nissan, Carlos Ghosn. In 2005,
Ghosn had emphasized that even the more feasible petrol/electric
(hybrid) cars represented a “terrible business prospect” (Ibison, 2005).
In 2013, when Germany's largest automobile companies had
announced a move to EVs, he instead stated to “welcome Germany
joining the club” as “[t]he more companies that buy into electric, the
better. […] All of this is helping to drive this tipping point” (Foy &
Bryant, 2013).
The case of the EV, therefore, seems well suited to study the
engagement of firms-in-an-industry in systemic innovation. Unlike
autonomous innovation, such as the introduction of emission-
reduction technologies or recyclable bags, the move towards EVs has
been very capital intensive and risky for the automobile companies.
Product innovation concerns are therefore likely to be closely inter-
twined with concerns about competitiveness, industry-wide behav-
iour, and regulation. Below, we will examine strategic motives used by
the individual companies to justify their engagement in EVs and how
these contributed to the changeover of positions within the industry
as a whole (Section 4). To this end, the next section first discusses the-
oretical explanations for the drivers of converging versus diverging
behaviour among firms-in-an-industry, before moving to the methods
(Section 3).
2 | DRIVERS FOR SUSTAINABLE PRODUCT
INNOVATION
2.1 | Drivers for converging behaviour
Why companies choose to invest in product innovation for sustain-
able technologies, that is, products that “strive to protect or
enhance the natural environment by conserving energy and/or
resources and reducing or eliminating use of toxic agents, pollution,
and waste” (Ottman, Stafford, & Hartman, 2006, p. 24) has long
been of interest to sustainability scholars. Whereas various frame-
works and typologies have been suggested to delineate different
forms of, for instance, eco-innovation (Sarasini, Hildenbrand, &
Brunklaus, 2014) or sustainability-oriented innovation (Hansen,
Grosse-Dunker, & Reichwald, 2009), most studies focus on sustain-
able product innovation as a generic concept (e.g., Chen, 2008;
Chen et al., 2006; Dangelico & Pujari, 2010). Scholars have, how-
ever, shown that the drivers for sustainable product innovation
depend on the “type” of innovation (e.g., Böttcher & Müller, 2015;
Pinkse et al., 2014).
“Autonomous sustainable product innovation” is stand-alone and
can be pursued independently by a company (Chesbrough & Teece,
1996)—developing it in-house and bringing it to the market autono-
mously. Examples include biodegradable plastics or bamboo phone
covers. Motives for engaging in autonomous innovation often relate
to competitive advantage, regulatory pressure, or reputation. “Sys-
temic sustainable product innovation” cannot be pursued autono-
mously by a single firm; it is co-dependent on innovation outside a
focal organization. The development and commercialization of sys-
temic innovation need to be coordinated, for instance via an ecosys-
tem strategy (Jacobides, Cennamo, & Gawer, 2018) or system-building
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networks (Planko et al., 2019; Planko, Cramer, Chappin, & Hekkert,
2016) and often also depend on changes at a broader societal level,
such as consumer behaviour or regulation. Examples include products
and services related to energy and mobility, which require changes in
infrastructure, rules, and norms. For systemic innovation, a transition
to sustainability is more challenging and can easily destroy core
competencies of incumbents. Hence, companies are careful not to
move too quickly into investment and managers have to rely on their
judgement of long-term prospects to engage in it (Cramer, Van der
Heijden, & Jonker, 2006; Sarasini & Jacob, 2014). It is often argued
that the push for systemic innovation needs to come from regulation
and/or concerns for corporate social responsibility (Peters, Schneider,
Griesshaber, & Hoffmann, 2012; Rennings, 2000). Nonetheless,
companies that face the need to engage in systemic innovation also
want to gain a competitive advantage and thus need to navigate the
seas between competition, innovation, and ongoing transition
dynamics.
The focus of the literature on sustainable product innovation as a
generic concept inherently means that rather limited attention has
been paid to companies as “concrete actors doing the acting,” also
labelled as firms-in-an-industry for more systemic innovation (Geels,
2014, p. 262). For systemic innovation, a perspective of firms-in-an-
industry is essential because companies in the same industry tend to
face similar types of institutional pressures, such as government regu-
lation, social norms, and common beliefs (Scott, 2001), and have an
incentive to act collectively on such pressures (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). It
has been argued that, within an industry, there is converging behav-
iour of companies in their sustainability practices (Geels, 2014; Hoff-
man, 1999), due to an isomorphic impact of the concomitant sources
of coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983). Whereas coercive isomorphism includes government
regulation, normative isomorphism implies change resulting from
professional networks and norms, and mimetic isomorphism refers to
imitation to catch up with competitors by, for example, adopting best
practices or copying them. Interestingly, due to “follow-the-leader”
behaviour (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993; Knickerbocker, 1973),
convergence in product innovation can even occur when the
motives of rivals' moves are unclear to a company, as it may want to
prevent competitors from gaining undue advantage (Chen &
MacMillan, 1992). When some companies adopt a technology, a
critical mass builds up at a certain point where uncertainty is
sufficiently reduced and/or the disadvantages of non-adoption
become too large, thus creating pressures to invest and “jump on the
bandwagon” (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Deephouse, 1996). This empha-
sizes the important role of those that deviate first from the herd and
set the bandwagon in motion.
2.2 | Drivers for diverging behaviour
Although isomorphic pressures should lead to converging sustainable
product innovation activities among firms-in-an-industry, there is also
variation in their responses (Oliver, 1991; Seo & Creed, 2002).
Literature has established that coercion breeds variation. Although
coercive pressures lead firms to adopt a similar direction in their envi-
ronmental strategies, there will also be variation within these strate-
gies because firms can gain relatively more from differentiation
(Milstein, Hart, & York, 2002). Companies respond in different ways,
as they try to plot their path between the different pressures (Pache &
Santos, 2010; Purdy & Gray, 2009). Besides, they do not only engage
in sustainability innovation to achieve a license to operate in society
and/or an industry, but also for more instrumental reasons (Aguilera,
Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007; Arnold & Hockerts, 2011). They
compete with one another based on their sustainability innovation
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2001) and thus also have disincentives to act
collectively and move concomitantly towards a shared industry
standard for sustainable product innovation (e.g., Hahn & Pinkse,
2014; Planko et al., 2019).
Generally, however, systemic innovation should not allow compa-
nies to reap strong first-mover advantages because uncertainties with
regard to the market and technology are high, shifts in technology and
consumer demand likely, and followers may be able to free-ride on
costly infrastructure investments (Montgomery & Lieberman, 1988).
Yet, incentives such as learning-based advantages and gaining techno-
logical leadership may still drive individual companies to act more pro-
actively than others and not simply “wait-and-see”. Against this
background, considerable disagreement will remain within an industry
as to whether, when, and how to move forward on a specific sustain-
able technology.
Divergence within industries has been at play, for example, with
regard to the climate change issue in the 1990s, when a few
frontrunners in the oil and automobile industries broke ranks in decid-
ing to move faster on the issue than other companies within the same
industries (Kolk & Levy, 2004). Similarly, although the chemical indus-
try moved collectively into embracing the Responsible Care standard,
there were also considerable differences between early and late
adopters in how they subsequently implemented the standard (King &
Lenox, 2000). Although isomorphism is relevant to the industry from a
regulatory perspective, companies operate globally and participate in
relevant networks across borders (Hansen, Lüdeke-Freund, Quan, &
West, 2018), that is, there is still ample room for manoeuvre and man-
agerial discretion. Studies on the impact of government support for
sustainable technologies showed, for example, that it proved less
important for the development of low-emission vehicles than support
provided by companies themselves (e.g., Pinkse et al., 2014). Compa-
nies might expect subsidies to be uncertain and subject to political
whims and sudden stops—some even have experience that they
stopped (Kolk & Levy, 2004, p. 179) and thus do not build their strate-
gies on them any longer.
How companies respond to institutional pressures is also likely
to vary depending on firm-specific and contextual contingencies.
Research has shown that the entry timing strategies of incumbents,
such as those of automobile companies for EVs, differ depending
on the single company's incentives and opportunities to innovate
(Lee & Klassen, 2016; Wesseling, Niesten, Faber, & Hekkert, 2015).
In addition, the opportunities and incentives that an individual
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company perceives depend on managerial perceptions of future
prospects and company-specific experiences with similar issues in
the past (Cramer et al., 2006; Sarasini & Jacob, 2014). Hence,
company-specific differences, particularly in perceptions of market
potential, customer demand, and the future of the industry do mat-
ter. There will be inconsistencies between different firms-in-an-
industry.
To summarize, then, although the literature suggests that there
are strong institutional forces pushing firms-within-an-industry to
make a concerted effort, company-specific attributes and strategies
may also lead individual companies to go against the tide. Yet, the
heterogeneity of incumbent behaviour remains an area with much
potential for future work (Smink, Hekkert, & Negro, 2015; Van
Mossel, Van Rijnsoever, & Hekkert, 2018). In particular, company-
specific differences in reporting on the engagement in sustainable
product innovation have been called “a fruitful area for further
research” (Wesseling et al., 2015, p. 528). Against this background,
this study sets out to investigate which strategic motives automo-
bile companies used to justify their engagement in EVs and how
this contributed to the changeover of positions within the industry
as a whole.
3 | METHODS
The case of the EV is well suited to study the evolution of an
industry's activities towards sustainable product innovation. Whereas
EVs have a long and checkered history within the automobile industry,
they have meanwhile achieved a level of diffusion that allows for a
retrospective analysis of company-specific differences in terms of
early versus late adopters and the move of the industry as a whole
towards more sustainable mobility. What has been specific to the
automobile industry in a sustainable technology context is the sub-
stantive influence of coercive isomorphism. Emission standards, fiscal
incentives, and industrial policy have been key in pushing automobile
companies in the direction of sustainability, generally, and sustainable
product innovation, more specifically (Kolk & Tsang, 2017; Pinkse et
al., 2014). Although most policies originated in specific national set-
tings, there has been a convergence overall, as governments tend to
take similar measures (Bohnsack et al., 2015). Moreover, despite dif-
ferent origins and histories of support regimes for lower emission
vehicles, incentives are usually available for all models in a particular
market, both to domestic and foreign companies that produce and/or
sell there (See Appendix A for EV support in different countries).
Therefore, the case of the EV offers the possibility to assess not only
how the automobile industry as a whole adapted to coercive
pressures, but also the motives that led single firms to deviate from
the herd.
We defined those companies as firms-in-an-industry that can
be seen as incumbents, that is, those firms that mainly have com-
petencies related to the current technological regime (Smink et al.,
2015; Van Mossel et al., 2018), and that are “established” and
positioned in markets with “traditional” business models (Ciulli &
Kolk, 2019). In our case, this included large automobile companies
with competencies related to the combustion engine such as GM,
Toyota, and Volkswagen (VW). It excluded, in turn, newcomers
with specialized competencies related to EVs such as Tesla. This
choice was anchored in our wish to investigate how incumbents,
which are powerful actors to “unlock” sustainability transitions
(Smith, Voß, & Grin, 2010), start to engage in sustainable product
innovation. Whereas a company like Tesla can certainly be seen as
a first mover in EVs, in our study, the definition of a first mover
and a follower relates only to the firms “within” the group of
incumbents.
To uncover the strategic motives of the incumbent automobile
companies to (not) engage in EVs, we looked for data sources that
allowed us to reconstruct their technology strategies and the argu-
ments they used to explain their position on electric mobility. Conse-
quently, we worked with archival data as it allowed us not only to
extract the moves these companies made, but also direct statements
by company representatives on the rationale behind them. Specifically,
we used the contents of two industry trade magazines (Automotive
News and WardsAuto World), a car magazine (Autoweek), a newspaper
(Financial Times) as well annual and sustainability reports of the 13
largest international automobile companies from Europe, Japan, and
the United States (see Table 1). In addition, online sources were used
to obtain car sales data.2 The period under study spans from 2006
until 2016.3 2006 was chosen as the starting year because it marked
the beginning of the “revival of electric” (Bakker et al., 2012), meaning
increased engagement in EVs after a period of non-activity, which
eventually led to the first modern mass-produced EVs. The year 2015
was chosen as the final one because, by then, electrification had
become an explicit part of most car manufacturers' technology
strategy.
The data analysis proceeded in the following steps: First, we
tried to establish, on a high level, which strategy a company had
followed with regard to EVs. This was based on information such
as the models they launched and the R&D investments they made.
Appendix B provides a summary of the different technology strate-
gies companies pursued. A comparison of these strategies provided
a first indication which companies had moved first and which com-
panies had followed the general industry development.4 In addition,
the evaluations of journalists and analysts helped us to contextual-
ize whether companies' moves were perceived as innovative or
merely as catching up with what others had done. In the next step,
we focused more closely on the strategic motives that companies
had expressed. Specifically, we extracted the direct, unfiltered
statements of company representatives such as the CEO from
interviews or sustainability reports in which they explained their
rationale for engaging in EVs. A pattern that quickly became appar-
ent was that statements either appealed to what we refer to as a
“sustainability focus” or a “competitive advantage focus”. The cross-
comparison of statements helped us to establish whether a com-
pany had emphasized one of the motives more than the other
when they started to engage in EVs.
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4 | THE DIFFUSION OF THE EV AS
SUSTAINABLE PRODUCT INNOVATION IN
THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
EVs were not new to the automobile industry. Already during the
initial development of automobiles, around 1900, an electric motor
was an option, but at the time, it lost the race against gasoline.
Interest in electric driving re-emerged during the oil crises in the
1970s, but EVs were not able to escape the “technological lock-in”
posed by other established car fuel types (Cowan & Hultén, 1996).
Out of the group of incumbents, particularly GM invested in EVs in
the 1980s and 1990s, before it stopped the venture for lack of
commercial viability in 2003 (Pinkse et al., 2014). More generally,
several automobile companies engaged in research and develop-
ment activities on lower emission vehicles over the years, including
EVs, as public pressure to address climate change had clearly
gained momentum and became widely acknowledged in the
industry (Kolk & Levy, 2004; Rothenberg & Levy, 2002). On
occasion, these explorations also took place in collaboration with
other companies inside and outside the industry. Yet, it was not
until 2006 that the industry significantly increased its EV activities
(Figure 1).
TABLE 1 Company reports analysed
Company 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
BMW AR AR, SR AR, SR AR AR, SR AR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR
Daimler AR AR AR AR AR AR AR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR
Fiat AR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR
Ford AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR AR
Geely AR AR AR AR AR AR AR AR AR AR
General Motors AR AR AR AR AR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR 10-K
Honda AR AR AR AR AR AR AR AR, SR AR, SR
Mitsubishi AR AR AR AR AR AR AR AR AR, SR AR, SR
Nissan-Renault AR AR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR
Peugeot/Citroën AR AR AR AR AR AR AR, SR AR AR, SR AR
Tesla AR AR AR AR AR AR
Toyota AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR
Volkswagen AR AR AR AR AR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR AR, SR
Volvo AR AR AR AR AR AR AR AR AR AR, SR
Abbreviations: AR, annual financial report; SR, sustainability/corporate responsibility (i.e., nonfinancial) report, 10-K, 10-K form.
F IGURE 1 Timeline. Launch of first purpose-built EVs highlighted in bold. List of industry events depicted on the timeline inclusive but non-
exhaustive. CAFE, corporate average fuel economy; LEV, low emission vehicle; EV, electric vehicle; FC, fuel cell; FCV, fuel cell vehicle; GM,
General Motors; HV, hybrid vehicle; PHEV, plug-in electric vehicle
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4.1 | Industry positions in the period 2006–2009:
EVs as “a necessary evil”?
Although EVs experienced a revival from 2006 onwards, the wave of
activities in the period 2006–2009 had an overwhelming focus on
prototypes, concept, and test cars, and was accompanied by publicly
expressed doubts about the future of EVs. Government policy in the
form of emission standards, fiscal incentives, and industrial policy
clearly put pressure on the automobile industry (Kolk & Tsang, 2017;
Pinkse et al., 2014). In addition, in 2008, the launch of the Tesla Road-
ster received a lot of public attention and, arguably, put pressure on
the incumbent car manufacturers to become more active. Also,
Toyota's success with the hybrid Prius and its first fuel-cell concept
cars increased momentum for alternatives to the gasoline-powered
engine.
In response to such pressures, many incumbents built concept
cars or prototypes (44 in total), used to present and/or experiment
with electric technologies or designs, but these were often not
intended for production. Furthermore, 14 test cars were examined
under controlled, real-world conditions to learn from and improve
the technology. Companies clearly wanted to be prepared if EVs
were to gain momentum. Often, they profited from the green cre-
dentials that their frequently highly publicized initiatives obtained.
For example, Chrysler, Renault, and BYD presented several concept
cars, learned about technologies, and attracted positive publicity.
Ford (Focus EV), BMW (Mini E), and Daimler (E-Smart) tested EVs
in controlled environments, received feedback from test customers,
and improved their reputation for being sustainable. Often, these
cars were modified, conventional vehicles built in small series, or
they were produced or modified through a third-party provider,
that is, converted EVs (Bohnsack et al., 2014). This development
suggests that the industry used them as a way of signalling to gov-
ernments and society that it was taking responsibility by develop-
ing technologies that could live up to norms set in the future but
did not consider these technologies mature enough to warrant a
massive move into electric mobility.
The majority of incumbents had strong reservations about the EV
readiness of the market, in general, and consumers, in particular,
although some companies had “mixed feelings,” exposing both nega-
tive and positive views. Toyota, for example, expressed being doubtful
about the applicability of EVs, as the following quote illustrates: “We
feel electric cars cannot replace normal vehicles. […] There will be a
market for this vehicle, but a limited one” (Reed, 2009a). Concurrently,
it did not want to exclude a possible future potential for EVs, which
might explain the development of three concept cars (e.g., Toyota FT-
EV) and two test cars (e.g., the Toyota Plug-In). And, although Daimler
suggested that EVs might help address emission and gasoline supply
issues in China, this company emphasized the barriers faced by EVs in
general, stating that “[t]he chances appear better on the fuel cell than
the battery electric side” (Kurylko, 2009). Furthermore, while consider-
ing EVs as a crucial technology, Volkswagen acknowledged that it
would take a long time before they might enter the market on a larger
scale.
Most incumbents, however, openly criticized the technology,
especially the batteries. Honda noted that “battery-based electric
vehicles aren't really practical at this point in time” (Greimel, 2008a):
“It's questionable whether consumers will accept the annoyances of
limited driving range and having to spend time charging them”
(Automotive News, 2010). Hyundai mentioned practical and cost-
related objections: “The usage of that kind of 100 percent electric
vehicle will be very, very limited. [ …] We are talking about a huge
amount of batteries sitting in the car. Who can afford that?” (Greimel,
2008b). Expectations regarding the moment at which EVs would leave
the niche, if at all, also varied considerably. VW regarded EVs as hav-
ing a distant timeline and believed that bringing EVs to the market
would be “an engineering marathon. It's not going to be a sprint. [ …]
Electric powertrains […] will be ‘a supplement’ to internal combustion
engines. […] [B]y 2020 EVs will have a global share of 1.5 to 2 per-
cent” (Guilford & Ciferri, 2009). Ford agreed that due to its character-
istics, EVs would remain a niche product. As its vice president of
research and advanced engineering stated: “I don't think it'll be a high
volume. It'll be tailored for city driving and a limited range. Overall, I
think it'll be significantly below 5 percent of the total new-car sales”
(Automotive News, 2008).
Hence, despite exploratory activities by incumbents, overall scep-
ticism and negative views prevailed. There was considerable uncer-
tainty in the industry about EVs, and their legitimacy was rather low.
What came to the fore towards the end of this period, though, was
that despite all the scepticism, three companies deviated from this
overall pattern.
4.2 | The emergence of a different position: EVs as
first-mover advantage?
GM, Mitsubishi, and Nissan were the first incumbents to bring
purpose-built EVs to the mainstream market with the Chevy Volt,
iMiev, and Leaf, respectively. They announced to have dedicated pro-
duction sites, although the volumes they expected differed largely.5
Strikingly, these three companies expressed much more positive mar-
ket expectations than their competitors. Looking closer at reasons
used to explain their engagement, a mix of strategic motives could be
noted, with nuances differing between the companies that also
seemed to be influenced by the specific context in which they operated.
4.2.1 | General Motors
GM put much emphasis on the need for its EVs to be competitive in
the mainstream market and argued that it was “determined to lead like
no one else can” (GM, 2007, p. 24). As mentioned above, GM had a
history of less successful engagement in the EV1, and its strategy was
to develop an EV with a back-up internal combustion engine rather
than one that relied on batteries alone, which disappointed (green) car
enthusiasts. The company was pressured by the U.S. government to
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develop sustainable technologies in exchange for loans to solve its
financial distress in the 2009 crisis. A move towards higher fuel effi-
ciency was also needed to be able to comply with U.S. corporate aver-
age fuel economy (CAFE) standards for its fleet and avoid having to
pay penalties. Concurrently, its CEO noted the importance of the EV
for GM: “As a ‘halo’ vehicle and an extremely important technology [
…], we think it's very important to have it” (Reed, 2009b). “We think it
will help position us, recognize what we do and recognize the capacity
that we have [ …]. We're not just doing it for image reasons, because
it's awful[ly] expensive” (Automotive News, 2006). Its previous experi-
ence may have informed the perspective on the role of the EV overall:
“The mass market EV has to be CAPABLE [emphasis in original] of
being your primary vehicle. […] I think pure battery electric vehicles –
they're not going to be niche vehicles, but they're not going to be a
primary vehicle” (Treece, Child, & Guilford, 2010). Nevertheless, GM
expressed to “believe in the ultimate electrification of the automobile.
[…] We believe that's where it's going” (LaReau, 2006).
4.2.2 | Mitsubishi
Mitsubishi also faced CAFE standards and a difficult financial situation,
having suffered consecutive losses in the early 2000s. Moreover, it
had failed to invest sufficiently in sustainable technologies, most nota-
bly lacking knowledge of hybrids. The company's commitment to a full
EV helped it to leapfrog technology-wise, address fuel-economy con-
cerns, and reorient itself as the iMiev represented one of the “new pil-
lars for penetrating new markets” (Greimel, 2010), while at the same
time displaying innovativeness and corporate responsibility. Acknowl-
edging that EVs seemed most suitable for city use, Mitsubishi saw EVs
as the ideal future technology, considering its environmental creden-
tials: “When our electric vehicle debuts next summer and people see it
running around the city, it will be highly valued. There's no noise, no
smell, no emissions. When you think about the entire industry, it's not
difficult to imagine 10 percent to 20 percent of cars being electric”
(Greimel, 2008c). Mitsubishi claimed that the “electric vehicle is the
embodiment of the ultimate eco-friendly vehicle” (Mitsubishi, 2007, p.
11) and later on stressed that the company wanted to “work to rapidly
create a low-carbon society” (Mitsubishi, 2009, p. 2). Besides,
Mitsubishi noted that their customers “have already had hybrids and
are ready to make the next step” (Guilford, 2010).
4.2.3 | Nissan
Nissan also had a history of financial trouble—which its new COO
(later CEO) Carlos Ghosn solved quickly after the start of the alliance
with Renault in 1999—as well as a history of technological follower-
ship and concomitant brand position. These latter problems appeared
to have inspired Ghosn's change of heart, as he stated at the share-
holder meeting in early 2007: “Our most urgent R&D challenge today
is to meet society's environmental expectations. That's why 40% of
our budget for advanced engineering is devoted to the Nissan Green
clean diesels.” The substantial EV investments they made had the
Nissan Leaf as flagship because, as Nissan's North American Senior
Vice President for Sales and Marketing put it: “I think this car can act
as a real halo for the Nissan brand. […] It can have a transformative
effect on the Nissan brand and how people perceive us” (Chappell,
2010b). Ghosn explained that “Nissan was a ‘me too’ company. But in
electric, we're pioneers.” Similar to Mitsubishi, Nissan envisioned a
large future market for EVs: “Electric vehicles could take 10 percent of
the global market by 2020, or roughly 6 million units in annual sales.
[…] We see it as mass market” (Greimel, 2009). The company pointed
at “a segment of eco-friendly consumers who are interested in going
to the next level. They own a hybrid vehicle. But if the next step is
available, they want to take it” (Chappell, 2010a).
When considering the strategic motives of the three companies,
it is striking that—compared with GM—both Mitsubishi and Nissan
positioned their EVs far more explicitly as eco-friendly cars that would
pave the way for a sustainable future and as their responsibility
towards society. However, although the large-scale EV projects
tended to be positioned as a way of being responsible towards soci-
ety, all companies also emphasized competitive advantages. After the
financial crisis 2009 had hit the car industry hard, they were in need
of flagship innovation projects. Regulators pressured GM to invest in
sustainable product innovation in exchange for loans, and Nissan was,
as the number three among Japanese automobile companies,
observed to suffer from severe “Prius envy.” Still, although both a sus-
tainability and a competitive advantage focus became apparent in
their strategic motives, the individual companies differed in their
emphasis of one over the other. This difference in emphasis becomes
even more salient when the strategies of all large companies in the
industry are considered. Table 2 illustrates automobile companies'
somewhat different assessments on a continuum between sustainabil-
ity and competitive advantage focus on the horizontal axis, while
distinguishing first movers and followers on the vertical axis.
As Table 2 indicates, the companies in the industry that most
clearly stressed that their engagement in EVs was part of their respon-
sibility towards society included Nissan, Mitsubishi, and BMW. At the
other end of the spectrum, we find those that expressed to be focused
on gaining a competitive advantage, particularly GM, Fiat, and Honda.
Overall, we can conclude that first movers generally put greater
emphasis on the higher cause of sustainable development as driving
their efforts, and followers on competitive dynamics. Yet, individual
companies also deviated from this pattern. In addition to GM as a first
mover that emphasized the competitive advantages of EV engage-
ment, an interesting case is BMW. BMW strongly emphasized sustain-
ability as a “higher cause” to motivate its actions and clearly pushed
the development of EVs in the period under study. Specifically, it
announced that its “long-term aim is to produce emissions-free mobil-
ity” (BMW, 2010, p. 35) and that “premium has to become sustainable
in the long-run” (FAZ, 2009, p. 14). With its project-i, BMW aimed to
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Program 2010, our five-year environmental blueprint. For our indus-
try, environmental sustainability represents the biggest engineering
challenge. Along with Renault we will pursue every possible avenue of
environmental progress—from hybrids to fuel-cells to electric cars and
develop a purpose-built electric megacity vehicle “that can lastingly
change mobility behaviour.” Although it only brought the i-series to
the market in 2013, and thus represents a follower in our classification
BMW emphasized its sustainability vision over competitive concerns.
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TABLE 2 Sustainability versus competitive advantage focus of incumbent first movers and followers
First mover Mitsubishi
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4.3 | Industry perceptions from 2010 onwards: A
mixed bag of sustainability and competitiveness?
The first movers' actions appeared to develop momentum for EVs,
creating a critical mass, or at least sufficient resonance more widely
for other companies to engage and take a more positive attitude.
Legitimacy for the EV thus gradually increased, as reflected in several
new models that were launched in the three years following 2010 (see
Table 3 for incumbents' EV engagement and Table 4 for worldwide
sales). It should be noted, however, that except for the three first
movers and BMW, the other companies paid most attention to modi-
fying conventional cars to EVs.
Although a growing group of followers emphasized EVs as an act
of corporate social responsibility, many companies kept their reserva-
tions, stressing the difficulty for EVs to compete with other car tech-
nologies. Honda (2012, p. 8) argued, for example, that “[e]
nvironmental technologies are increasingly vital to competitiveness in
the automotive sector.” Likewise, Geely (2013, p. 15), which acquired
Volvo in the period covered by this study, announced that “[t]he
Group will also leverage on Volvo Car's leading technology on hybrid
electric vehicles to achieve a gradual transition from hybrid to pure
electric technology.” Ford also offered a more positive perspective
than before, stating that its “electrification strategy foresees a future
that includes different types of electrified vehicles, depending on cus-
tomers' needs. There will not be a one-size-fits-all approach, but a
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
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(VW, 2011, p. 55)
Note. Some parts are put in bold by the authors to highlight the core themes of the quotes. Given the large number of sources for the findings presented in
this table, we do not provide detailed references for all statements. Full referencing is available from the authors upon request.
diverse and smart range of applications of different types of electrified
vehicle technologies.”6 Yet, Ford was careful in picking winning tech-
nologies a priori and argued: “We prefer to provide our customers the
power of choice” (Ford, 2012, p. 16). Accordingly, the company
claimed that “[a]ll Ford front-wheel drive and all-wheel drive global
platforms are engineered to accept a full technology range of gasoline,
TABLE 3 Incumbents' EV engagement in the U.S. market
Company First model Year Location of first launch Purpose-built vs. converted Other models
GM Chevy Volt 2010 US Purpose-built
Nissan-Renault Leaf 2010 Japan & United States Purpose-built ZOE, Twizy
Mitsubishi i-MIEV 2010 Japan Purpose-built
Daimler Smart EV 2011 Germany Converted
Ford Focus EV 2011 US Converted
Toyota Prius-Plug-in 2012 Japan & US Converted/Purpose-built
Honda Honda Fit EV 2012 Japan (2010) Converted
BMW i3 2013 Germany Purpose-built i8
Fiat e500 2013 US Converted
Geely Volvo V60-PlugIn 2013 Sweden (2012) Converted XC90 Plug-In
VW e-Up 2013 Germany Converted e-Golf
Note: Year refers to start of EV sales. Whether a car is purpose-built is at times debatable. For example, the Chevrolet Volt is based on the platform of the
Chevrolet Cruze but could also be considered purpose-built; the Prius Plug-in is a purpose-built hybrid that has been extended, but it is not a purpose-built
EV. By contrast, the Ford Focus Electric is clearly converted-only, with the car's technology being a compromise.
Abbreviation: EV, electric vehicle.
Sources: http://energy.gov/downloads/electric-and-hybrid-electric-vehicle-sales-december-2010-june-2013, and http://ev-sales.blogspot.nl/2014_01_01_
archive.html (both accessed 19 May 2014)
TABLE 4 Worldwide sales of the Top 20 (PH) EV models in 2015
Rank in 2015 Model Volume in 2015 Purpose-built* Type
1 Tesla Model S 50.366 Yes EV
2 Nissan Leaf 43.870 Yes EV
3 Mitsubishi Outlander PHEV 43.259 No PHEV
4 BYD Qin 31.898 No PHEV
5 BMW i3 24.083 No EV
6 Kandi K11 Panda EV 20.390 Yes EV
7 Renault Zoe 18.846 Yes EV
8 BYD Tang 18.375 No PHEV
9 Chevrolet Volt 17.508 Yes PHEV
10 Volkswagen GTE 17.282 No PHEV
11 BAIC E-Series EV 16.488 No EV
12 Zotye Z100/Cloud EV 15.467 No EV
13 Volkswagen e-Golf 15.356 No EV
14 Audi A3 e-Tron 11.962 No PHEV
15 Roewe 550 PHEV 10.711 No PHEV
16 JAC J3 EV 10.420 No EV
17 Ford Fusion Energi 9.894 No PHEV
18 Ford C-Max Energi 9.643 No PHEV
19 Kandi K10 EV 7.665 Yes EV
20 Kia Soul EV 7.510 No EV
Total 400.993
*Note: See footnote under Table 3
Source: Derived from the EV-Sales Blog which provides the most comprehensive information on EV sales, http://ev-sales.blogspot.nl/2014/01/
world-top-20-december-2013-special.html, last accessed 19 May 2014 and https://ev-sales.blogspot.pt/2016/01/world-top-20-december-2015-special.
html, last accessed 4 May 2016. The figures for 11 and 15 were indicated to be estimates.
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diesel, hybrid, plug-in hybrid or electric vehicle propulsion systems”
(Ford, 2012, p. 16).
Hence, despite positive developments in the direction of the
wider diffusion of EVs, many companies remained sceptical and were
undecided as to which technology would be most suitable for a move
towards sustainable mobility. For example, GM (2013 SR, p. 11),7
while having pioneered the range-extender technology, mentioned
being concerned about the future of EV technology, largely because
of limited demand: “consumer acceptance of advanced technology
vehicles, such as plug-in electric vehicles, has not been growing as
quickly as many in our industry predicted.” It also noted advances in
fuel-saving technologies more broadly: “Furthermore, we're achieving
truly remarkable progress in vehicle and internal combustion engine
efficiencies.” Volkswagen (2013, p. 142) pointed to the limitations for
EVs in the current situation: “In the area of battery chemistry, devel-
oping high-performance batteries and building up technological exper-
tise are both vital to increasing the range and hence the
attractiveness of electric vehicles. Another challenge is integrating
electric cars into the existing infrastructure.” Fiat (2013, p. 38) men-
tioned that “technological and cost barriers limit the mass-market
potential of […] electric vehicles.”
In line with the companies' modest expectations, the market share
of EVs in 2013 was still negligible. The markets with the highest mar-
ket share were Norway (6.1%), the Netherlands (5.6%), and the United
States (1.3%; Mock & Yang, 2014, p. 3). Although it might be
suggested that generous policies led to these figures, it should be
noted that in countries with similar incentives (see Appendix A), mar-
ket shares were considerably lower (e.g., Denmark [0.3%] or the
United Kingdom [0.2%]). What had started as the “revival of electric”
(Bakker et al., 2012) now seemed to be stuck in limbo between
becoming an industry standard or fading away as an electric episode,
like it had happened before. An announcement by Fiat's CEO March-
ionne echoes this. At a conference, he stated that “I hope you don't
buy [the 500e] because every time I sell one it costs me $14,000.”8
Because the 500e is a converted vehicle, this might also speak for the
possible success of purpose-built EVs. A certain number of companies,
particularly those based in Japan, also prepared for a future with fuel-
cell vehicles and adjusted their portfolio in case this technology would
take off there. For instance, Toyota pushed the development of the
Mirai as the first fuel-cell vehicle available for the passenger market.
Honda and Nissan, in turn, “announced an agreement to work
together with other Japanese automotive manufacturers to support
hydrogen station infrastructure development” (Honda 2015, SR;
Nissan 2015, SR, p. 29).
And yet, although the future of EVs was uncertain, the revival had
created momentum for the electrification of cars. Notably, companies
started to embed their technology strategy for EVs into their efforts
to respond to a larger transformation of the automotive industry and
individual mobility. Especially in European markets, they began to
develop new business models, such as mobility-as-a-service, to reduce
the need for individuals to own cars. Pioneered by Daimler with the
car2go system in 2008, BMW, Fiat, and Toyota mentioned experi-
ments in carsharing for EVs in their sustainability reports in 2014, and
also, GM, Ford, and Peugeot had developed urban mobility carsharing
systems by 2015. Another trend affecting EVs was the emergence of
autonomous driving. Tesla was at the vanguard of this innovation,
making models with autopilot modes available in 2014. By 2016, all
major car companies headquartered in Europe or the United States
had plans to test or include autonomous driving in their EV offerings,
especially for those aimed at Western markets.Furthermore, China
renewed its environmental policy, which promoted the development
and sale of EVs, even though the innovation centred on improving car
performance to boost individual passenger car sales. Along these lines,
the Chinese EV makers' global share rose from 31% in 2015 to 43% in
2016, largely based on the growth of the Chinese market, which
turned China into the fastest growing market globally and the largest
volume market. In addition to Chinese companies such as BAIC and
SAIC, which introduced up to five new models in both 2014 and
2015, Western companies like Renault-Nissan also started to collabo-
rate with Chinese companies (in this case BYD) in order to have a
stake in a new developing market with great potential.
5 | DISCUSSION
This study aimed to shed light on how sustainable product innovation
activities evolve from individual firm action to an industry-wide activ-
ity. Based on the case of the EV, it focused on the strategic motives
that individual companies used to justify their engagement in sustain-
able product innovation and how this contributed to the changeover
of positions within the industry as a whole. Our analysis showed that,
within a relatively short period of time, a group of large automobile
companies collectively moved to the production of EVs through a
combination of coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures (DiMaggio
& Powell, 1983). Governments' coercion gave the initial push, trigger-
ing the collective engagement in EVs, but it was the normative and
mimetic pressure created by three first movers—Nissan, GM, and
Mitsubishi—that provided a further thrust to the industry to provide
EVs as a way to fulfil societal obligations. Legitimacy in the industry
thus gradually increased, as reflected in the launch of several new EVs
in the 3 years following 2010. Most incumbents jumped on the band-
wagon and showed herd behaviour; the only incumbents that did not
engage in EV development were Mazda, Hyundai, and Suzuki.
This rather swift convergence seems like quite a sea change given
that, in the initial years of the period under study, the companies in
the industry had diverging perceptions with regard to the prospects of
EVs and to engaging in EV production at all. Emphasizing convergence,
therefore, does not provide a full account of how EVs came to be
adopted as a sustainability practice in the automobile industry. Indus-
try positions converged considerably, but not fully. Subsequent to the
engagement of the three large incumbents, followers mainly started to
convert conventional vehicles into EVs to keep up with developments
and be prepared in case EVs would become mainstream. With the
exception of BMW, they largely failed to see an immediate future for
EVs due to cost, infrastructure, and technological barriers. Therefore,
although the engagement in EVs generally became widespread over
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the past decade, the terms of engagement stayed poles apart between
companies.
First movers generally positioned their engagement in EVs as part
of their corporate social responsibility and sustainable innovation
efforts, whereas followers leaned more towards seeing EVs as a
means to an end, with the end being competitive advantage, or at
least not incurring competitive disadvantages by missing the boat.
This, however, is not to say that first movers did not focus on eco-
nomic motives and acted for merely altruistic reasons. For example,
Nissan and Mitsubishi were, due to their history, both in need of flag-
ship innovation projects. GM, on the other hand, was a first mover
that faced more immediate pressures to comply with regulatory stan-
dards for its fleet. Their early engagement in EVs was supported by
company-internal circumstances such as financial distress and the
need to brush up their technological image and, to some degree, exter-
nal circumstances such as policy support. Arguably, the actions of
these companies paved the way for others to see a sustainability and
a competitive advantage focus no longer as mutually exclusive. The
strategic motives that fast-follower BMW (2012, p. 38) expressed
nicely reflect this blending of foci, emphasizing that the EV “also
stands for a new understanding of the term “premium” that is strongly
defined by sustainability.”
In other words, by creating normative and mimetic pressures, first
movers' actions drove the bandwagon, opening the door for perceiv-
ing sustainable product innovation as a source of a long-term competi-
tive advantage. Figure 2 summarizes the points made thus far. It also
serves to highlight the important role of first movers' actions in closing
the chasm between coercive pressures, which are usually triggered by
events and actions outside the firms-in-an-industry, and mimetic and
normative pressures, which subsequently arise from the competitive
dynamics among the firms-in-an-industry.
Interestingly, this dynamic resembles the one between niche
players and incumbents that the sustainable entrepreneurship domain
has put forward. In their study on the interaction between sustainabil-
ity entrepreneurs and incumbents, Hockerts and Wüstenhagen (2010)
argue that sustainable entrepreneurs first push a sustainability focus.
Incumbents then follow into the sustainability niche but introduce a
cost focus and make sustainable innovation ready for the masses. Our
analysis highlights that within the group of incumbents, a similar
dynamic takes place as well: First movers create the possibility to posi-
tion the engagement in sustainable product innovation as both moti-
vated by competitive advantage and sustainability. Our analysis of the
EV case also shows that the ultimate transformation of markets does
not simply “occur” as a result of such first-mover and follower dynam-
ics. For autonomous innovation, followers' tendency to jump on the
bandwagon may quickly result in the replacement of industry stan-
dards and dominant technologies (e.g., Geels, 2018). For systemic
innovation, however, co-dependencies to changes in infrastructure,
user behaviour, and other technologies may lead to continuous uncer-
tainty. The constant hesitation expressed by GM in the years follow-
ing 2010 is living proof of this struggle between wanting to “green”
the product portfolio, on the one hand, and pursuing it even when
customer response stays lukewarm, on the other.
What appears to be one of the main peculiarities of sustainable
product innovation in the automobile industry is that whatever tech-
nology will become the main foundation of sustainable mobility in the
future, it will involve a highly capital-intensive change that may prove
to be disruptive to existing competitive positions (Pinkse et al., 2014).
Any move towards higher engagement in sustainable technology hits
the competitive core of the automobile industry. The question
whether it will pay off to become more responsive to societal con-
cerns is therefore an inevitable one (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). Even
those companies that legitimize their EV engagements in terms of hav-
ing a responsibility towards society will also be preoccupied with the
competitive dimension of EV technology. The financial stakes are sim-
ply too high to invest in EVs only to please governments and other
organizations criticizing the industry for damaging the environment. A
sustainability and competitive advantage focus thus need to come
together to enable systemic forms of sustainable product innovation.
The analysis presented in this paper is not without limitations.
The study relied on an analysis of publicly available data including
trade journals, magazines, newspapers, annual reports, and online
sources. Although these sources allowed for a comprehensive recon-
struction of the developments over the course of 10 years, the infor-
mation may have been subject to reporting bias (Yin, 2009). Some
events may have received more attention than others in the public
domain, and incumbents' motives were presented in a specific light by
journalists. We tried to address this potential problem by working as
much as possible with direct statements from the companies and tri-
angulating between different sources. Moreover, although the auto-
motive industry and its activities with regard to the EV are a well-
suited case to look at the establishment of sustainable product innova-
tion that requires systemic changes, due to its vast scale, high sunk
costs, and complexity in terms of organization, production, sourcing,
products, and technology, some of the dynamics observed in this
paper could be idiosyncratic to this sector. It would be interesting,
therefore, to replicate this study in a different industry, such as utili-
ties or the oil and gas sector, and examine incumbents' engagement in
renewables. More research on the automotive industry, and
F IGURE 2 First movers' central role in pushing industry
transformation toward sustainable product innovation
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incumbents in particular, is also needed considering recent technologi-
cal developments such as autonomous driving and social innovation
related to carsharing (Ciulli & Kolk, 2019). It would be interesting to
study how these developments interact with the development of EVs
and the diffusion of systemic innovation.
Lastly, future research might also pay more attention to the influ-
ence of geographically bound government policies on car manufac-
turers' innovation strategies (cf. Bohnsack et al., 2015). Whereas our
analysis already indicated that coercive pressures such as the CAFE
standards in the United States might have triggered first movers'
actions, it would also be interesting to consider how different national
market regimes influence industry-wide action. For instance, the
Chinese market is a huge market globally and the largest volume
market for EVs and has often been used by car manufacturers to jus-
tify their continuous engagement in EVs despite moderate demand in
their home markets. In general, further insights into the particularities
of entry timing strategies for sustainable product innovation that
requires systemic changes would be highly relevant to inform the
governance of sustainability transitions. Policymakers, for instance,
can benefit from a better understanding of the strategic motives, in
addition to regulatory pressures, that lead incumbents to engage in
sustainable product innovation.
6 | CONCLUSION
Through an in-depth analysis of the case of the EV, this paper contrib-
uted to the understanding of the diffusion process for sustainable
product innovation that co-depends on systemic changes in the indus-
try. This is important, not least because many explanations on innova-
tion diffusion are based on studies that take autonomous innovation
as a vantage point. Bringing autonomous innovation to the market,
however, is fundamentally different from the long-term, co-
evolutionary change processes that characterize systemic innovation.
The paper thus responded to calls from scholars to move beyond the
use of innovation frameworks that consider the single firm rather than
firms-in-an-industry (Geels, 2018). The analysis of the EV case has
highlighted the important role of first-moving companies, with a diver-
gent behaviour that can drive a bandwagon of convergent behaviour
to eventually help move the industry as a whole towards sustainable
product innovation. Focusing on the interplay of sustainability visions
and economic rationales as strategic motives for engagement, we
found that opportunistic reasons such as the need for flagship innova-
tion projects may trigger firms in an industry to move first. By doing
so, however, they enable a combined sustainability and competitive
advantage focus for the industry as a whole, which may support, at
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ENDNOTES
1 It should be pointed out that, although EVs are considered more sustain-
able than other types of cars, especially those with a traditional internal
combustion engine, and thus as epitomizing companies' corporate social
responsibility, the degree to which this might be the case depends on
the type of energy used (Bohnsack, Pinkse, & Kolk, 2014; Romm, 2006).
Given their potential to improve energy efficiency and air quality and
reduce environmental degradation, we follow the widely shared percep-
tion of EVs as a form of sustainable mobility.
2 It must be noted that some of the sales data are estimates from the
internet; this has been indicated in the findings. We preferred using
somewhat less accurate data instead of having no data at all, as the fig-
ures approximate the scale of the various EV engagements of individual
automobile companies.
3 Because a part of the analysis was based on a larger study for which data
were collected until 2010, the sources from Automotive News, WardsAuto
World, Autoweek, and the Financial Times were only available for the
2006–2010 period. The other data sources spanned the whole period of
2006–2015.
4 In this study, we tie the definition of a first mover to the timing of public
announcements to commit to the EV and the market launch of a first,
purpose-built model for the mainstream market. Because many compa-
nies made significant investments in technology research on electric
driving, we focused on the commitment to purpose-built EVs as a core
part of a company's future product portfolio to differentiate a first mover
from a follower.
5 For instance, the Mitsubishi iMiev, first available in 2009, started with
1,400 cars and was planned to eventually grow to 55,000. The initial
numbers for the GM Volt and Nissan Leaf, both introduced 1 year later,
were higher, with 10,000 and 13,000, respectively, and so were the
projections (100,000 and 500,000, respectively).
6 http://corporate.ford.com/microsites/sustainability-report-2012-13/
environment-products-electrification-strategy, last accessed 22 July
2014.
7 Company references refer to the analysed annual reports as displayed in
Table 2. In the case of a reference from a sustainability report, the abbre-
viation SR is added to the year of the report.
8 http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/21/chrsyelr-ceo-evs-
idUSL1N0O71MS20140521, last accessed 24 July 2014.
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APPENDIX A
Main fiscal incentives related to EVs in different countries
Country One-time subsidies* Fiscal incentives Specification
China up to 60,000 RMB (7,200
EUR)
EVs exempted from annual taxes —
Denmark N/A EVs exempted from registration fee; annual
circulation tax exemption
For cars up to 2,000 kg
France up to 7,000 EUR EVs exempted from registration tax; company car
tax exempted
Up to 20% of the price of the car
(bonus-malus system)
Germany N/A EVs exempted from circulation tax; deduction of
tax for company cars
—
Japan up to 850,000 JPY (6,300
EUR)
EVs exempted from acquisition tax; annual tax
50% exemption
For the purchase of a new car
Netherlands N/A EVs exempted from circulation tax and company
cars from income tax
—
Norway N/A EVs exempted from 25% VATCirculation tax only
350 EUR
—
Sweden up to 40,000 SEK (4,500
EUR)





up to 5,000 GBP (5,800
EUR)
EVs exempted from excise duty, tax on company
cars exempted
Rebate of up to 25% of the price of the car; no
circulation tax
United States up to 7,5000 USD (5,400
EUR)
— Based on battery capacity
*Note. Specific amounts depend on purchasing price and CO2 emissions.
Sources: ACEA (http://www.acea.be/images/uploads/files/20100420_EV_tax_overview.pdf), New York Times (http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/
02/china-to-start-pilot-program-providing-subsidies-for-electric-cars-and-hybrids/), U.S. Department of Energy (http://www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/laws/
laws/US/tech/3270), JAMA (http://jama.org/pdf/FactSheet10-2009-09-24.pdf), accessed 3 August 2011; Mock & Yang, 2014.
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APPENDIX B
Company Overview of EV Strategy 2006–2015
BMW Started off with the MINI E in 2009 BMW. In 2013, they launched the i-series cars, a far-reaching initiative developing completely new
vehicle concepts. In the long term, BMW's aim is to produce emission-free mobility with vehicles powered by electricity and hydrogen.
BMW believes that online applications and networks will be important in bringing changes to future mobility.
Daimler Daimler developed the electric Smart and established Car2Go, a car sharing scheme in which EVs could be used. Since 2010 Daimler also
developed the electric A-and B-class. Daimler's ambition is to develop EVs over the whole spectrum. Daimler's smart brand that includes
smartfortwo, smartforfour, and the smart convertible models to be launched in 2016, is intended to enhance the company's position in the
field of electric mobility. A strategic partnership with a Chinese company to launch a fully electric vehicle (DENZA)is part of their strategy.
Daimler is also heavily involved in the use of digital technologies for innovative mobility concepts like car2go, CharterWay, Bus Rapid
Transit (BRT) and the “moovel” mobility platform.
Fiat Launched the first EV in 2012 (Fiat 500e). Fiat believes that natural gas is the most effective and affordable solution to reducing CO2
emissions, but the company is also working on research & development of electric vehicles. Fiat has a cautionary stand on the feasibility of
launching aggressively on such technologies while still maintaining competitiveness. Instead, it outlines a commitment to reduce emissions
by developing increasingly efficient technologies for conventional engines, expanding the use of alternative fuels (such as natural gas and
biofuels), and developing alternative propulsion systems (such as hybrid or electric solutions). It launched its first EV Fiat500e in 2012 and
introduced the Chrysler Pacifica Hybrid at the beginning of 2016.
Ford Ford focuses on making all of their models available with ICE, hybrid, and electric motors. In this way they believe that they can satisfy most
needs. The goal is to gradually reduce the production of ICEs. Ford has a broad strategy of developing and maintaining its business on the
wider vehicle spectrum including electrified products. It launched a new version of its Focus EV among its new electrified products. By
2020, it plans to invest $4.5 billion in electrified vehicle solutions.
General Motors General Motors commenced its move toward EVs again in 2007 by signing contracts with two battery technology companies. The Chevrolet
Volt was made available in the US in 2010. GM believes that electrically driven vehicles are the best long-term solution for providing
sustainable personal transport. GM is investing heavily on multiple technologies offering increasing levels of vehicle electrification including
eAssist, plug-in hybrid, full hybrid, extended range and battery electric vehicles. Chevrolet Volt and Cadillac ELR are among its extended
range of offerings, while the all-electric Bolt EV is planned to go into production in late 2016. As part of its long-term strategy to reduce
petroleum consumption and greenhouse gas emissions, it plans to continue developing hydrogen fuel cell technology like the Chevrolet
Equinox fuel cell electric vehicle.
Honda Honda invests in fuel efficient technologies but has no outspoken EV strategy. As Honda's first EV, the Fit EV was to be released in Japan and
US in 2013. Since 2007, however, they have produced electric motorcycles. Honda promotes a wide variety of environmental friendly
technologies, including gasoline engines with lower fuel consumption, hybrid vehicles, plug-in hybrid vehicles and electric vehicles. To
address emission and energy issues, it is developing the Honda Smart Home System (HSHS). To seize new business opportunities, it is
advancing the development of electric vehicles (EV) and fuel cell vehicles (FCV) and securing partnership with other companies for the
preparation of hydrogen infrastructure.
Mitsubishi In 2006, Mitsubishi already stated that they aimed at bringing an affordable EV to the market by 2010. The iMiev was their first EV in 2010.
In 2009 Mitsubishi stated that it believed EVs would become the future. By 2020 Mitsubishi aims to reach a 20% of higher total production
ratio of EVs. Mitsubishi has also stated, in 2013, its plan to work on infrastructure in order to accelerate the growth in the EV market.
Mitsubishi promotes sustainability initiatives in each of its business activities by promoting the widespread use of electric vehicles. In 2013,
it launched the Outlander PHEV, a plug-in hybrid electric vehicle. Together with strategic business partners, Mitsubishi intends to promote
lithium-ion battery business for eco-friendly vehicles and electricity storage systems that emit minimal level of CO2.
Nissan Since 2007, the Alliance between Nissan and Renault, has made large investments in R&D into EVs. Nissan aims at becoming a global leader
in zero-emission vehicles together with Renault. In 2010, the first EV was launched in the U.S. and Japan. In their first generation, the
alliance produced four different models. The aim was to have 1.5 million EVs on the road by 2016. Nissan is a foremost advocate for the
development of recharging networks. In the long term, it aims to increase the adoption of zero-emission vehicles—battery electric and
fuel-cell electric (EVs and FCEVs), and to promote the use of renewable energy to power these technologies.
Peugeot The company has launched the Peugeot Ion and Citroën C-Zero EVs in 2010, models that were rebadged iMievs from Mitsubishi. Mitsubishi
wants to reduce emissions, but they are not only focusing on EVs, but also optimizing ICEs and hybrids. The company has maintained its
R&D spending to commit itself to CO2 reduction and environmental issues by reducing vehicle weight, optimizing engine performance and
electrifying the drivetrain.
Toyota In 2009, the FT-EV was Toyota's first concept for an EV. In 2010, Toyota established a partnership with Tesla involving the development of
EVs. The plan was to introduce 10 new hybrid models by 2015 and also develop plug-in EVs, EVs and fuel-cell EVs to meet the need of the
market. Toyota believes hybrids will be the future generation of cars. Toyota has under the “New Vehicle Zero CO2 Challenge,” decided to
challenge itself to reduce vehicle CO2 emissions by 90% in comparison with 2010 levels, by 2050.
Volkswagen In 2006, VW stated that they expect an electric drive system within two decades drawing energy either from fuel-cells or batteries. In 2011,
the eUp! Was announced, but VW is still careful in their optimism and believes that e-mobility still faces challenges, notably those related
to charging system and infrastructure. Therefore, VW believes that hybrids will be very important the coming years when it comes to
electrification. VW has a goal of reducing energy and water consumption, waste and emissions per unit produced across the Group by 25%
and be the market leader in electric mobility by 2018. The company's e-mobility strategy is tailored to the Chinese market and provides for
both joint ventures to successively produce plug-in hybrids and electric vehicles locally.
Volvo Volvo produced the V60 Plug-in hybrid, which reached customers in 2012, being the world's first diesel hybrid. Volvo has not stated a specific
EV strategy but is committed to a better environment and society.
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